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Anyone and Everyone, Potentially:  
For a Political Philosophy for all Humans, without Limits 
ANYONE: The Cosmopolitan Subject of Anthropology, by Nigel Rapport, New York & 
Oxford: Berghan Books, 2012, ISBN 978-0-85745-519-2 (hardback). 
A complex normative political theory for liberalism; an ethnography of a life; 
reflections on the ontological nature of human being as consciousness, body, and 
being in the world; a defence of the ideology of science as a norm of reason; a 
critique of identity politics, an opposition to all fundamentalisms; an account of the 
importance of manners for the civilizing process, and a reflexive account of being 
Jewish – these are the concerns of this book. Clearly, it ranges far and wide, 
something that hardly makes it an easy book to review.  
I shall begin this review with an overview of the themes of the book before entering 
into a more detailed discussion. 
The book opens by addressing ‘cosmopolitanism’1, noting the crucial embedding of 
the term in Kant’s philosophy. The worth of the term, cosmopolitanism, the author 
suggests, depends on three main lines of argument. First, that there is an irreducible 
humankind; second, that anyone who is a species member is simultaneously 
universal and unique; third, that the glue which holds the unique in the universal is a 
set of norms that the author refers to as politesse, norms that transgress the 
specificities of members’ categorization devices, such as those constituting gender, 
                                                        
1 The reviewer first encountered this concept in Gouldner’s (1957/1958) noteworthy discussion of 
‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘locals’, which, surprisingly, is a source omitted by the author. 
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ethnicity, class, religiosity, and so on. With respect to this third point concerning the 
constitution of civil society, the author, surprisingly, does not consider the 
contribution of Elias (1969), perhaps because an historical account of manners, 
especially in the statal terms that Elias uses, would undercut the ontological focus 
that the author favours. If human nature is historically contingent it cannot also be 
universal.  
Anyone is to be differentiated from Everyman. Anyone is the ontological centre of 
Rapport’s moral universe, a category that collapses the distinction Agamben (1998) 
draws between bare life and human life (see Pinha e Cunha, Clegg, Rego, and 
Lancione 2012). In Rapport’s book, a considered life of feeling, interpreting, and 
knowing oneself is sufficient to make Anyone human: “Anyone’s birthright, it might 
be said, is his or her futurity: the capacity to define the human in the context of his 
or her individual life. The tie between Anyone and humankind microcosm to 
macrocosm – is immanent and irreducible” (page 4). At the core of this relation is 
‘liberty of choice’ regarding form of life and world-view. Such liberty requires a 
human being free and able to navigate life’s passages in terms that do not 
unreflexively cohere with those of “symbolic collectivization … the predominance of 
thinking and acting in categorical terms” (page 7)2. Essence should be created from 
existence, not categorical devices, from achievement, not ascription.  
There is an underlying discussion of a particular form of categorical device and 
identity throughout the book, especially at the end. As a Jew, he argues, channelling 
                                                        
2 In this respect there are similarities with Laclau and Mouffes’ (1985) view – a position that is not 
discussed, it should be clear – of hegemony as consisting of an acceptance of categorical imperatives 
rather than sustaining a position of radical doubt and scepticism towards all such claims. 
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Finkielkraut (1994: 82), Israel functions as a categorical signifier above all others, as a 
place which those marginalized as “Jewish” by dominant categorical devices of 
religiosity, ethnicity and nationalism, may hold on to with A Dream of Belonging 
(Janina Bauman 1988), even as sojourners in a life lived elsewhere and otherwise. 
The book challenges notions of global cultural integration and multicultural 
differentiation and fragmentation alike. The former privileges those fundamentalists 
that wish to make one set of categorical imperatives (obey only God, Allah, Nature, 
etc.) preeminent and enforceable while the latter blur important questions of 
qualitative difference in their judgement of social constructionist primacy, occluding 
the fact that “’nature’ is a domain of universal truths” (page 13)3.  
Above I have tried to provide an account of the introduction to the book as well as 
imply some of the overall qualities. Now I wish to enter into the argument of the 
book in more detail.  
Part 1 of the book deals with a broad review of cosmopolitanism, beginning with its 
etymology: cosmos, meaning the whole, while polites signifies being a member of 
some polity. Clearly, these are terms united in tension. The tension is somewhat 
formal, however, because individual consciousness belongs “both to localized 
settings and to global possibilities” (page 21). While the local is real and immediate 
for everyone the global possibilities are infinitely more remote in their distribution 
as far as anyone in particular is concerned. Following Kant, cosmopolitan rights are 
                                                        
3 Latour (1993) provides an interesting point of contrast in his remarkable book, We Have Never Been 
Modern, which does much to dispel any smugness or ontological security that might attach to the 
categories of ‘nature’.  
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constituted, ideally, in terms of a hospitality that neither harms the guest nor 
exploits the host, in which the stranger is welcomed into the fold of local humanity4.  
More contemporaneously, cosmopolitanism develops five specific characteristics, 
suggests Rapport: as moral, as normative, as a social condition, as an orientation, 
and as a specific kind of actor. Moral cosmopolitanism may be seen in Rawls’ (1971) 
theory of justice.  Notions of universal human rights and attempts to institutionalize 
them characterize normative cosmopolitanism. To be human today, Rapport 
suggests, is to partake in a specific kind of social condition, one of global 
consciousness of oneself as a unique constituent of a lonely planet, whose members 
are helter-skelter in a trajectory of reflexive modernization. (Many, perhaps the vast 
majority, must be less than fully human in real terms in consideration of this 
calculus.) Cosmopolitanism is open as an orientation to the world, eschewing 
nostalgia and sentimentality for local differences held fondly, a capacity to live with 
radical difference. As a kind of actor the cosmopolitan is polymorphic, plural, and 
disembedded.  
Cosmopolitanism begins to sounds like something one might encounter, if one is 
(doubly) lucky, in the first class lounge at an airport. Perhaps one might find it in rare 
moments in the congress halls of the great academies of the social sciences and 
humanities, although the chances are slim. These institutions have overwhelmingly 
                                                        
4 Empirically, less ideally and more often, strangers will barely be noticed or, if noticed, tolerated. 
Asylum seekers are shunned not welcomed; put into camps. The homeless are an invisible presence, 
splashed by mud from the Bentley in the passing traffic, unseen and in all probability having less in 
the way of Kantian rights and global possibilities than the chauffeur, let alone the oligarch in the rear. 
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national rather than cosmopolitan themes, suggests Rapport. Moreover, a global 
elite of privileged white males, mostly embedded in capitalist political economies, 
ideologies, and practices, carry these themes through the airport lounges and into 
the program.  Although there are claims to cosmopolitanism from outside of 
Western European Enlightenment traditions these are various forms of realist 
critique that Rapport will not admit in his imaginary for Anyone, situated between 
the facts of human uniqueness and sensemaking capacities and aspiration that 
“human beings everywhere should be afforded the space and opportunity to fulfil 
this potential for sense-making” (page 41).  
A cosmopolitan anthropology is sketched next in a space conceived as one always 
marked by social tolerance but never intellectual tolerance (after Gellner 1974). Such 
anthropology is both a practical and teleological enterprise in a liberalism that 
stands opposed to multiculturalism, globalization, and pluralism as sources of 
entrenching differences in the social. It opposes and is opposed everywhere by 
“flawed consumers” of modernity, fundamentalists of faith and cultural identity 
alike, to use Zygmunt Baumans’ (1998) felicitous term, those characters unable, 
reluctant, or fearful of imagining a life story of their own making, and thus incapable 
of being ironic about the choices the fates have bestowed and reflective enough to 
imagine a life other than that which the fates script. Cosmopolis must be peopled by 
“free and autonomous individuals” (page 57), free to choose. In many ways the 
individuals imagined are those for whom opportunity rather than confusion is 
offered by “liquid modernity” (a term that might usefully have been introduced into 
the discussion of “The fluidity of experience”, pages 59-62: see Bauman 2000; Clegg 
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and Baumeler 2010). In these pages, discussing the free and autonomous individual 
and the fluidity of experience the idealism and normativism of the book shines 
through most clearly.  
Sources of cosmopolitan hope are next discussed in aspirations towards a “universal 
humanism”, carried by human rights discourse, world cities, and global issues. None 
of these will secure global governance, something that Rapport addresses through 
five potential processes: extending, or allying, the cultural community; multiplying, 
civilizing or regulating the liberal state. From community the aspirations work out 
and upwards; for the state aspirations work out, down and envelop territory in 
networks and entanglements.  
Finally, in this first part of the book, there is a brief discussion of “cosmopolitan 
politesse” as the informal procedures that should buttress the formal procedures of 
global governance.  Together with “formal and constitutional procedures” there 
must be “informal norms of mannerly exchange” (page 75), regulating laws and 
mores of a civil society cast in a liberal and democratic mode in which illiberalism – a 
lack of tolerance for otherness – is contained.  
Thus ends the first and most difficult part of the book. Part of the difficulty is an 
effect of the writing style: serial consideration of sources discussed in detail for a 
paragraph or two, layered on each other, and with an implicit assumption that the 
reader may have some familiarity with the sources, to ease the reading. On second 
read things fall into place but there is missed opportunity to say things more clearly, 
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to signpost the way more often, and to offer succour to the reader less versed and 
immersed in the issues than the author.  
In Part 2 of the book, the tack changes sharply. We are introduced to Rickey Hirsch in 
an extended, almost auto-ethnography (see Reed-Danahay, 1997), peppered with 
some authorial reflections. The particulars of Rickey’s fascinating life need not detain 
us here; suffice to say, that he is, indeed, a global cosmopolitan with long-lived 
experiences. What is important for Rapport is that the tale is told in his own words 
by Rickey, illuminating a life of individual movement and contingency, great risk and 
danger, adventure and misadventure. The focus is very much on Rickey as the 
competent author of his circumstances but in this celebration of agency perhaps the 
realities of agencies’ relations of duality with structure are minimized? I think so: 
without reference to Rickey’s Jewish identity and to a Europe beset by fascism, war 
and endless flows of refugees, the story makes little sense. It is a story of one 
remarkable life but what is remarkable in part is that, unlike so many others, this life 
was not snuffed out, made dust by categorical devices and associated technologies 
of power (Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips 2006: chapter 6).  
The third part of the book deals with the nature of a human science and of social 
order. A human science, Rapport insists, must deal with the whole person: their 
consciousness, body, and environment. His way into this discussion is through two 
famous dead bodies: those of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Kierkegaard, deeply 
unfashionable for many years, is celebrated because of his unflinching focus on a 
passionate subjectivity as the state of being. Being is explored through accounts of 
personal truth as political and physiological, and as a feature of the physical 
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environment.  Kierkegaard is quickly consigned to the wings however, and after a 
brief trot through John Stuart Mill (1972) On Liberty, we are taken into a discussion 
of a Foucauldian-inspired account of the “standardized child” as a subject of 
“surveillance medicine” in James’ (2005) work. The point of this is to suggest the 
tyranny of the bureaucratically regulatory gaze and the loss of autonomy of selfhood 
of those subjected to it.  
A further exegesis follows as we move from childhood to earthworms via discussion 
of reflexivity. Earthworms, in Turner’s (2000) work, are valued for their environment 
shaping capabilities, transforming the nature they are in so that it serves their vital 
needs. Earthworms burrow where humans lead through their activity in the world 
from prenatal life onwards (Edelman 1992).  Some serious shifting of levels occurs in 
this analysis from evolutionary arguments about natural selection in populations, in 
Popper and Eccles (1977), back to personal truths and Kierkegaard. The stitching is 
pretty loose even while the method, of serial discussion of disparate works, is now 
clearly evident as a matter of style.  
And so to Nietzsche and an excursus on the physical and mental health of the last 
years of his life (his Umnachtung): the research questions are – did Nietzsche have 
syphilis or not and to what extent did his writings interact with the health of his 
body? The focus is on the will to power in these later writings, where every living 
thing is seen to be in a state of constant struggle to assert itself, against all the 
resistance of other things, living or not, in the environment through which bodies 
move, grew, deteriorate and die. Nothing stays the same; everything is in process, 
flux, transition, becoming and decaying as “federations of separate and ultimately 
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antagonistic forces which temporarily exploited their mutual alliance” (page 147). All 
things should be seen as constellations of power, the outcome of tensions and 
struggles with no structural determination. Whatever sense of structuration is 
constructed by (any) Anyone is to be interpreted as nothing other than strategies of 
power. In these musings Rapport sees the truths by which Nietzsche sought to live as 
bearing a homology with his personal truths. Again, the stitching seems pretty loose. 
What is patterned in this section is a distinction between the purity of the sciences 
as a disinterested pastime that can be rendered objective (without any account of 
how this is done) and the purity of the human sciences as a capture of personal 
truths, which will be quilted in the following chapter. 
Simmel (1971) provides the entry to the question of the relation of the individual 
and the whole. His work serves as a lesson in “distortions”. These distortions are 
those of the type, the ideal, and the representative, the forms that veiled individual 
things-in-the-world, the phenomenal ways of categorizing the essential numina of 
the person, which remained opaque. The excursus through Simmel, ultimately, 
prepares the ground for a question that could, perhaps, have been more fruitfully 
reached through a discussion of realist theories of science: how to “ground the 
relation between individual human beings in empirical reality and not merely in a 
socially constructed phenomenalism”? The ambition is explicitly political:  
“[G]enuine knowledge of the way in which the individual instantiates the 
human as well as a route to genuine democracy in which the individual and 
the liberal state share a relation of mutual identification (the individual sees 
himself or herself in the state, the state sees itself as an aggregation of 
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individuals) … [in which] … [t]he individual is unique and yet scientifically 
accommodated as an exemplar of the species; the individual is unique and 
yet the subject of statal policies of universal recognition and attention” (page 
157).  
Three ways of relating the one and the whole are envisaged through metaphors of 
flowering, family resemblance, and a spectrum of possibilities. Human embodiment 
is taken as a fundament. The properties of this fundament are a distinct materiality, 
spatiality, temporality, environmental range, and genetic capacities, creating an 
overall set of capacities that define the person. While all humans share these 
properties each individual occupies a unique configuration of them. The proper 
question for Rapport’s political philosophy thus becomes how each individual as a 
thing-in-itself is treated and treats others. Ruled out by fiat is any deployment of 
categorical devices; instead, it is the unique and potential capacities that must be 
deployed. 
After a brief aside on Iris Murdoch (1970) and William Golding (1988) the focus on 
capacities leads into a discussion of Humphrey’s (1997) Amnesty lecture on 
children‘s rights, and social responsibilities for ensuring them, which is to guarantee 
a scientific education in order to prepare children to loosen and question dogmas 
and fundamentalisms, making them free to become whatever they might be free to 
be. The state’s role is to ensure that this can happen. These freedoms of agency are, 
as all sociologists of education realise, deeply structurally constrained and 
embedded in specific national and local practices. 
 11 
Implications flow from this argument. One is that a proper education should be a 
right not a privilege only the wealthy can buy; a second is that there is no role for 
religion or any other form of fundamentalism in shaping the education of children – 
their potentialities must flower as untrammelled as possible. How these outcomes 
might be achieved is not entirely clear: the argument would hardly seem to prepare 
the ground for either community or state control of education. Perhaps the solution 
would be Durkheimian, the inculcation of civic morals premised on professional 
ethics, where these ethics are those of science, albeit a science whose parameters 
remain unclear from the book (Durkheim 1992).  
The penultimate chapter of this exploration of Anyone is consideration of politesse 
as a virtue, where the individual is recognised as an end in themselves. However, the 
highly individualistic liberalism begins to break up at this point: politesse is 
acknowledged as existing within “cultural milieu”, “speech communities”, “front 
stage” and “back stage” repertoires, “language codes” and “forms of life” (pages 
175-7). It would seem that we are back in the world of those members’ 
categorization devices (Sacks 1972 – another likely source that, oddly, is never 
mentioned) that so much effort has been expended on avoiding. The subsequent 
discussion seems anthropologically to favour a contractarian and negotiated order 
model of society comprised of interactional routines sustained by ceremonial and 
taken-for-granted aspects of everyday talk: politesse as the constitutive and 
preferential rules outlined by Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodology?  One issue 
suggests itself: if “cosmopolitan politesse is conceived of as a moral means to engage 
with Anyone on a potentially global scale” (page 185) only liberal subjects, as 
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defined, will have the capacities to so engage with other forms of life – so how does 
politesse deal with radical alterity, with actants such as a drone or suicide bomber? 
The death and destruction wrought by one may be rooted in rationalism and the 
other mired in faith but the effects of each are equally destructive. What price irony 
in these circumstances?  
Penultimately, we have a projection of the liberal values on a global scale as a 
general good, which would be fine in a global world shaped by post-Enlightenment 
virtues, but that is hardly the case.  There are myriad Anyones composed of tensions 
that have no bearings in the post-Enlightenment world for which the liberal notion 
of the individual is literally, meaningless. How can we speak of cosmopolitanism if 
we do not go out of our comfort zone, our philosophical tradition, our epistemology, 
our ontology - if one wants to be a cosmopolitan one needs to engage with other 
traditions than those that nourish one.  
Towards the end of the chapter the focus is on a number of anthropological studies 
of specific communities, specific ethnographies. Each is discussed as a case in itself in 
turn.  While each case is clearly an example of good anthropology at work each case 
is very contained: an English village; Lebanese status and honour codes; the 
Mechinacu of Brazil, and dissimulation in Indonesian Java. By treating each as its 
own universe, as an anthropological microcosm, the interaction effects, as it were, 
are played down.  
Rapport seeks to ground his analysis (pages 193-5) in the category of 
“perfectionism”. Not all social formations strive for excellence in the individualistic 
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terms that are accommodated by the category of “perfectionism, however. Good 
manners are nice to have but are no basis for a universal order. Manners are deeply 
culturally embedded and the good varies generationally, culturally, situationally.  
Finally, there are some reflections on Jewish Cosmopolitanism5. Here, perhaps as 
much as anywhere, one can see the limits of the argument. The one term, “Jewish”, 
is a category that is ascribed not achieved6; the other term, “cosmopolitanism”, is a 
state of being that would dispense with all categorical imperatives. They simply are 
not bedfellows.  
Overall, as a reviewer of many books, some of which have been less straightforward 
than one might wish, this is perhaps the least straightforward and the most 
fascinating of all. While it builds a marvellous moral case for a specific form of 
liberalism as an ideal it is silent on all those actually existing forms of practice that 
would subvert its realization, those ‘circuits of power’ (Clegg 1989) that choke its 
noble ambitions, that divert it obligatory passage points, and constitute the 
normalcy of the political life. As moral philosophy the book gets top marks; as 
political theory it scores well, as a prognosis for empirical realism it is considerably 
more constrained. 
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